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URBAN REDEVELOPMENT TO FURTHER
AESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS:
THE CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS
OF POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN*
W. PAUL GORMLEYt
The pressing need for urban communities to improve their
physical environments is receiving increased attention from special-
ists in many areas, including the members of the legal profession.
Architects, sociologists, statesmen, and planners of all types are
changing the face of America's modern cities. This desire to improve
the aesthetic quality of the United States is recognized by President
Johnson as an essential feature of his proposed "Great Society,"
in which blighted cities and bleak suburbs will be replaced by a
"beautiful America."' Though many diverse political, economic
and human problems become involved in federal and state redevelop-
ment plans, basic legal considerations are still of primary importance
for the reason that there is an ever-increasing clash between the
rights of private property owners as against the use of eminent
domain and police power by the sovereign. In fact, these two
constitutional provisions-previously held to be separate and dis-
tinct, though closely related-are now in the process of "modifica-
tion," not by means of a constitutional amendment, but through
judicial interpretation. The leading case of Berman v. Parker2
presents a new insight into the use and application--or perhaps even
a misuse-of the police power and eminent domain as complementary
legal norms. Indeed, Berman v. Parker is actually growing in
importance because it constitutes the basic authority for a new
* This study is based on one prepared for Professor Herman Hilman in the Graduate
Seminar on "Legal, Social and Political Aspects of Urbanization," New York University
School of Law. While acknowledging the help received from Professor Hillman, the writer
assumes full responsibility for all statements.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. A.B., 1949, San Jose State College;M.A., 1951, Southern California; Ph.D., 1952, Denver; LL.B., 1957, LL.M., 1958, George
Washington.
1. State of the Union Message by President Johnson, January 4, 1964. In order to
achieve the goals of his "Great Society" he advocated the creation of a Department of
Housing and Urban Development. "We do not intend to live-in the midst of abundance-
isolated from neighbors and nature, confined by blighted cities and bleak suburbs .... The
first step is to break old patterns-to begin to think, work and plan for the development of
entire metropolitan areas. We will take this step with new programs of help for basic
community facilities .... New and existing programs will open to those cities which work
together to develop unified long-range policies for metropolitan areas. We nust also
make important changes in our housing programs if we are to pursue these same basic
goals. A Department of Housing and Urban Development will be needed to spearhead this
effort in our cities."
2. 348 U.S. 26 (1954), affirming Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705(D.D.C. 1953).
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line of cases not only from the United States Supreme Court,8 but
also the lower federal courts,' and even the highest tribunals of
the states.5 This 1954 decision by the Supreme Court remains the
fundamental pronouncement of the merger of the police power and
eminent domain into a single legal entity, not only as to urban
redevelopment but also in a large number of federal renewal
schemes.6 Accordingly, it seems desirable to consider the direction
in which this judicial legislation is moving.7  Regardless of the
viewpoint taken concerning the desirability, or lack of desirability,
of redevelopment and renewal programs, one inescapable conclusion
emerges: the concept of police power used to further aesthetic
considerations-supported by "just compensation" drawn from
eminent domain-will be broadened in the future. While the com-
munity interest will be served, some individuals and groups will
suffer. For instance, approximately four million people will be
displaced from their homes by 1970; one out of every fifty persons
living in the United States" will be compelled to leave condemned
structures. While many practical arguments in favor of urban re-
development plans can be offered,9 a basic judicial consideration
still must be resolved; how far can federal and state laws (and
even municipal ordinances) go without violating the constitutional
rights of private land owners?
Obviously, the courts in the United States have adopted a changed
attitude as to private property rights in relation to community
planning during the last half century.10 The aesthetic needs of
our major cities now predominate, and the implication of such a
social-functional approach seems fairly obvious. Citizens and cities
alike must evaluate the interest of the community in protecting
existing private property rights as against the community interest
of rebuilding and rehabilitating marginal and gray areas, in addition
3. E.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) ; Ivanhow Irriga-
tion District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
4. See collected cases, infra notes 51 through 58.
5. E.g., Allen v. City Council, 215 Ga. 778, 113 S.E.2d 621 (1960), 70 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1961); State ex rel. Saveland Park 1olding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217 (1955), 35 NEB. L. REv. 143 (1956). See also Note, 50 CAL. L. REV. 483 (1962).
6. See HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 409-566 (1959). Craig, on the other hand, says:
"In urban renewal projects, the workings of police power regulation and eminent domain
can be seen at their closest conjunction. Formerly, urban redevelopment concentrated on
demolition and rebuilding from the ground up, but now renewal programs, with their
rehabilitation and conservation techniques, involve the use of regulations such as housing
codes, building codes, and sanitary codes, applied within the renewal area to properties
not taken by eminent domain." Regulation and Purchase: Two Governmental Ways to
Attain Planned Land Use, in LAW AND LAND: ANGLO-AMERICAN PLANNING PRACTICE 207
(Haar ed. 1964).
7. Craig tends to take a more moderate position than that of the writer. He does
not speak of the merger of police power and eminent domain, but concludes: "There Is
increasing narrowness of the line between police power regulation and eminent domain in
the attainment of planned land use .... Distinctions between the two powers on the basis
of difference in mode of application, as between uniform application and case to case
application, become much less useful as the police power Is adopted to a multiplicity of
shading and classifications in application." Id. at 211.
"8. The Truth About Urban Renewal, Nation's Business, Jan., 1964, p. 31. See ANDER-
SON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1919-1962 (1964).
9. For an extremely able appeal in favor of governmental action see McDougal &
Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An Anochronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42
(1942).
10. Note, 72 HA~v. L. REv. 504 (1959).
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to such normal governmental functions as slum clearance and the
protection of the health, welfare, safety, and morals of the popula-
tion. The need for urban redevelopment and city planning, therefore,
becomes involved with legal doctrines promulgated at a period in
history when cities barely existed, let alone city planning.
The issue presented in Berman is not the traditional problem
of slum clearance or the use of police power to protect the health,
welfare, safety, or morals of the population but rather the use of
such police power-with some elements of eminent domain-for
purely aesthetic considerations." The point of contention was that
private land, in this instance a department store, was to be seized
and condemned by the National Capitol Planning Commission and
subsequently turned over to another private individual in keeping
with the objectives of the federal agency. It was argued that such a
seizure was permitted under the terms of the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act. 12 In spite of the fact that "just compensation"
was to be awarded in keeping with the normal use of eminent
domain, a challenge to the constitutionality of the Act was made
on the ground that "public purpose" as required under the terms
of the fifth amendment did not exist because the land in question
was merely being made available to another private person, thereby
depriving the petitioner of his property. The power of Congress to
provide for the general welfare in the District of Columbia clashed
with the right of petitioner to own and enjoy the exclusive us of his
property in the absence of any statutory violation."
THE PROBLEM
It seems obvious that by the process of substituting "public
purpose" for "public use" as the relevant test of constitutionality
11. Note, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 730 (1955). But see Murphy v. Town of Westport,
131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944), which followed the older view that private property
could not be taken for aesthetic considerations. In the past, the law of aesthetics has
ridden the two vehicles of police power and eminent domain. But cf. Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 265 (1926). See also From Blackstone to Berman v.
Parker : The Public Use Requirement In Urban Renewal, in HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING
410-469 (1959). For an excellent discussion of the changed attitudes of courts relative
to aesthetic control of outdoor advertising, see Note, 6 ST. Louis L.J. 534 (1961).
12. D.C. CODE §§ 5-701 to 5-719 (1951). Section 2 states that Congress made a "legis-
lative determination [that] owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-
out, and other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to
substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as
dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to protect and
promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating all
such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate for the
purpose. [These ends cannot be obtained] . . . by the ordinary operations of private
enterprise alone without public participation; [that] sound replanning and redevelopment
of an obsolescent or obsolescing portion cannot be accomplished unless it be done in the
light of comprehensive and coordinated planning of the whole territory of the District
of Columbia and its environs . . . the acquisition and the assembly of real property and
the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment
plan . . . is hereby declared to be a public use." Id. at § 701.
13. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated: "The power of Congress over the District
of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its af-
fairs. . . . We deal . . . with what traditionally has been known as the police power. An
attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn
on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations
addressed to the purpose of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically
capable of complete definition." Berman v. Parker, aupra note 2, at 31-32.
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the narrow concept of eminent domain is being substantially enlarged
to the extent that it now tends to resemble that of police power.",
Unfortunately, the courts, in upholding the actions of governments
in an area such as aesthetics do not spell out the precise limits of the
power on which their decisions rest with the desired degree of
specificity. 15 The Berman case, for example, contains some "inter-
esting language," but it does not indicate the exact status of
constitutional law. May it be suggested, therefore, that the Supreme
Court, in allowing the District of Columbia to eliminate gray areas
in housing, is creating an even more difficult "gray area" in con-
temporary constitutional law for the reason that one cannot be
certain as to the scope of the police power as it becomes related to
that of eminent domain under a modified concept of public purpose.16
Nonetheless, in considering the Berman doctrine and its subsequent
impact on developing law it is necessary to first consider the two
basic concepts involved.
a. Police power.
The traditional notion of police power was clearly restricted to
matters of public necessity. Thus, property might be seized or even
destroyed for a limited purpose, often of an emergency nature; 17
no liability attached to the state or municipality; and no compensation
had to be awarded. 8 This lack of compensation for restrictions
placed on the free enjoyment of land was its main distinguishing
feature. In addition, the great majority of examples from the police
power sphere concerned a restriction on the use of property rather
than an outright taking.
In considering the extent of the police power it is well to note
14. In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896), the Court
said that the fifth amendment provides: "property shall not be taken for a public use
without Just compensation." [Emphasis added.] Likewise, the fourteenth amendment
prohibits state action that deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, which requires that the taking by the state be for a public purpose.
Attacks on the validity of both federal and state exercise of eminent domain have at-
tempted to raise for Judicial consideration the issues of: 1. the extent to which the
property may be taken, and 2. whether the use contemplated is a public use. See Brown
v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923); New York Housing Authority v. Muller, 270, N.Y.
313, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936), 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949). Moreover, the particular use to be
made of the property has been accorded great deference by the courts, as is shown by
the Berman case. See also United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welsh, 327 U.S. 546 (1946) in
which the Supreme Court held that the use was purely a legislative question and beyond
judicial review.
15. Craig says that "the old distinctions are becoming less workable. . . . Thus public
purchase is now used to take a property out of circulation, as well as for the conventional
purpose of recirculating it for the public. In recent years, particularly in its application to
planned land-use control, eminent domain goals have been broadened from "public use "
to a wider concept of "public purpose," thus minimizing the importance of the public's
mere title in the taken property and emphasizing the purpose, possibly negative, for
which the title has been taken." Craig, op. cit. supra note 6, at 182-183.
16. See infra notes 49-50.
17. E.g., "destruction of diseased animals and plants, burning of buildings to create a
back-fire, restrictions on use of natural resources to prevent waste." KAUPER, CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW 1110-1112 (2d ed. 1960). For a typical statement of the traditional concept
of state police power see RUSSELL, THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 85-100 (1900).
"Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the police
power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there
seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health and pro-
perty of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals.
Id. at 100.
18. E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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Justice Holmes' classic pronouncement, "It may be said in a general
way that the police power extends to all the great public needs ...
It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held
by the prevailing morality on strong and preponderant opinion to
be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."' 19 By
way of contrast, in the Berman case the Supreme Court spoke of
the public purpose rather than public use; hence, the traditional
limitations placed on the use of police power are giving way to
eminent domain. 20 Justice Douglas made it clear that the taking
was a valid exercise of the police power on the theory that the
power of eminent domain was merely a means selected to accomplish
the objective. With reference to private property, the police power
is used in most instances to restrict or regulate the use of such
property for the protection of public health, welfare, safety, or
morals. On the other hand, when property is taken from the owner
to create or provide some particular benefit for the public, the
power of eminent domain is exercised so as to enable a public
agency to acquire an interest in the property, such as a fee or an
easement. The limitations on the exercise of these powers had
previously been regarded as being quite different and referring to
separate criteria. Each one had a distinctly separate function.
The use of police power by a state must not be unreasonable
or arbitrary, and it must have a substantial relation to the objective
of the seizure. Yet, the scope of police power-when aided by the
use of eminent domain-is very broad; and judicial review is limited
to an examination of reasonableness of the means to accomplish the
objective.2 1 That is to say, under the new approach the main legal
test is whether the taking was in fact "reasonable," with the result
that the private property owner has only the protection of the
reasonableness test.
b. Eminent domain.
The power of eminent domain contains a two-fold limitation;
just compensation must be paid, and the property cannot be taken
unless it is seized for a public use. In fact, the concept has been
stretched to such an extreme position that the requirement of public
use no longer exists;2 2 and seizure is justified if only the public
purpose test has been met. Therefore, neither the necessity nor the
extent of the taking are judicial questions. 28
19. Nobel State Bank V. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
20. Craig, op. cit. supra note 6, at 181-211. See also 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§
7.3-7.5111, at 670-700, and §§ 7.5156-7.5157 at 760-791 (3rd ed. 1964).
21. ROTTsCHAEPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82-88 (1939).
22. Harwell v. United States, 316 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. 91.69
Acres of Land, 334 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1964); and Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp.
487 (D. Ore. 1964). See also Grant, The "Higher Law" Background oj the Law of Emi-
nent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv 67 (1931) ; Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law
of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv.. 615 (1940) ; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949) ; Note, 23
ALBANY L. REv. 386 (1959). See NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 20.
23. The problem of according the Just compensation to be paid upon a taking for
320
CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS
The federal constitution does not expressly confer eminent
domain power on the federal government, but this power is implied
to the extent necessary to carry on the functions of government,
provided just compensation is paid. 2' Does the term "public use"
imply a limitation on the eminent domain power? In United States
v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville,25  the court affirmed the
district court's dismissal of a condemnation proceeding instituted
by the United States for the purpose of securing fee-simple title to
lands needed for development of a low-cost housing and slum clear-
ance project, for the court held that it was not within the power of
the government to condemn the property for these purposes. Con-
versely, a number of earlier decisions had upheld the right of the
government to acquire private land in order to erect public housing
projects. 2 6 In these earlier instances, however, the title remained
with the particular public authority, and no resale to other private
individuals took place or was even contemplated. Obviously, Berman
has definitely changed this legal standard.
In considering the expanded employment of eminent domain,
in reality the basis of Berman, the court cited the prior leading
case of Shoemaker v. United States.27 This 1893 verdict upheld the
acquisition of land under eminent domain for the creation of Rock
Creek Park in the District of Columbia. This case, however, is a
rather typical example of seizure for a public use, i.e., park purposes.
Naturally, disputes of this type continue with growing frequency.28
It should be recognized that the typical case does in fact serve as
the foundation for the newer approach. For example, Wilson v.
Lambert29 allowed the adjoining land owners to be assessed the
cost of the land taken for Rock Creek Park in view of the fact that
the value of their land was greatly increased; therefore, the com-
pensation paid to the original land owners did not come entirely
public use presents great difficulties. The standard applied is that of the owner's loss and
not that of the taker's gain, which is the measure of Just compensation. United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943). Fair market value is the normal measure of recovery.United States ex rel. T.V.A. V. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943). See in particular
ORGoEL, VALUATION UNDER EmTNE1NT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953). Problems of value peculiar
to the owner, consequential damages of enhanced value brought about by the project for
which the land is condemned, compensation for interests less than a fee, and many other
elements complicate the determination of what is just compensation.
24. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
25. 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935). For the older view see Corwin, Constitutional Aspects
of Federal Housing, 84 U. PA. L. RLv. 131 (1935). Contra: United States ex rel. T.V.A.
v. Welch, supra note 14.
26. Craig, op. cit. 8upra note 6, at 193-197. For an excellent discussion, see Johnstone,
The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CL . REv. 301 (1958).
27. 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
28. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 175 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Tenn. 1959);
citing the leading case of United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946). See
especially id., at 422-423 for the District Court's application of the Berman case. Note
the application of the Berman doctrine in United States v. 23.9129 Acres of Land, 192F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Cal. 1961). The court stated: "[I]t appears that the road is to be built
and operated by a private owner under agreement with the Government. There is nothing
legally wrong with this procedure. It is not necessary that the road be built and operated
by public agencies. The only requirement is that it be built for a public purpose (Berman
v. Parker, oupra). Insofar as this issue is concerned, it is clear that the taking is for
a public purpose." Id. at 103.
29. 168 U.S. 611 (1898).
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from the federal government. In United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Railway Co.8o it was held that the federal government could acquire
the Gettysburg battlefield areas for patriotic and military reasons
on the theory that such national monuments created aesthetic values
constituting a great benefit to the entire nation. The writer believes
that the Gettysburg case is in fact the basis upon which the Berman
decision rests, though the Court does not so indicate. A later decision
has very ably shown the relationship of such early cases l with the
Berman concept. Subsequently, it has been held that a state could
take land from private persons and then give it to the federal
government in order to establish a national park; hence, aesthetic
considerations were given an even broader scope.32
The conclusion to be drawn from the above cases is that the
Supreme Court has become more liberal concerning the right of a
government to use the power of eminent domain on the ground that
just compensation is provided the owners. Indeed, these prior hold-
ings dealing with aesthetic considerations have not been reversed
but stand as a bulwark for the Berman rule, but we must not lose
sight of the fact that Berman does not contain a single reference to
a prior judicial pronouncement in regard to aesthetics. Nevertheless,
the decision clearly recognizes such aesthetic considerations as a
basis for condemnation. The issue that remains is whether the
area of aesthetic improvements-formerly a sub-division of police
power-remains within the scope of police power exclusively or also
under eminent domain.
THE RATIONALE OF THE MERGER
The older cases indicated above kept these two concepts
separated. The modern trend has been to give considerable leeway
to the use of police power so as to bring it closer to eminent domain,
provided that just compensation is given in those instances where
property is taken rather than suffering a mere restrictiona" It
seems obvious, therefore, that the government can accomplish much
more if it uses police power rather than relying exclusively upon
eminent domain. Indeed, many early redevelopment aims could
not be realized under the more restricted eminent domain; con-
sequently, in order to bring this broader authority into play, early
statutes resorted to subterfuge and would include aesthetic objectives
within the broader ground of health, welfare, safety, or morals.
In effect, then, Berman represents a major step in the movement
to include aesthetics within the scope of police power. In evaluating
30. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
31. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, supra note 28, at 422-423, for an
application of these early cases, United States v. 39.970 Acres of Land. 360 U.S. 328(1959); United States v. Carmack, supra note 28; United States v. Gettysburg Electric
I. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
32. Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Commission, 196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 563 (1928).
33. Note, Aesthetics as a Justification for the Exercise of the Police Power or Eminent
Domain, 23 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 730 (1955).
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the traditional use of police power it must be recognized that the
basis of the decisions was the legitimate protection of the public.
To illustrate, the early case of Welch v. Swasey3 4 sanctioned the
regulation of the height of buildings in Boston. It was held that such
regulation was a reasonable effort to promote the public safety by
preventing the uncontrollable spread of fire among the tops of tall
buildings; hence, it was a valid exercise of the police power. As
the court stated: 3 5
The inhabitants of a city or town cannot be compelled to
give up rights in property, or to pay taxes, for purely
aesthetic objects; but if the primary and substantive purpose
of the legislation is such as justified the act, considerations
of taste and beauty may enter in, as auxiliary. [Emphasis
added.]
This language has led one writer to conclude that the above decision
formulated the rule that even though the primary purpose of the
act is aesthetic, it may be upheld if here is a secondary purpose of
promoting public health or safety.36 In other words, a valid police
regulation will not be invalidated by the inclusion of an aesthetic
principal. This relatively simple rule represents the intermediate
view, which was later to be expanded into aesthetic considerations,
minus the legal fiction of health and safety. Nonetheless, the courts
would often hesitate to enforce regulations that obviously did not have
the promotion of police power as their primary consideration. For
instance, in Piper v. Ekern3 7 the court refused to go to the extreme
of upholding a Wisconsin statute limiting the erection of buildings
to ninety feet tall around the State Capitol building. The real aim,
namely to beautify the area, was clearly recognized and rejected
as an invalid legislative determination.
The next major advancement of the trend to include the aesthetic
field within the police power involved the long line of billboard
disputes wherein the courts finally held that they constituted a
menace to the public health, welfare, safety and morals, in a number
of very strained decisions. For example, such reasoning was used
as the billboards could: hide immoral acts, constitute a fire hazard,
or fall down on pedestrians if struck by a strong wind. Thus, the
leading case in the expansion of the police power for aesthetic
considerations was St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of
34. 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), aff', 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
35. Supra note 33, at 736. The general rule of this case is that a valid regulation for
health and safety would not be invalidated by the inclusion of an aesthetic factor; there-
fore, a major break had been made in the old concept of police power. Accord: Cochran
v. Preston, 10 Md. 220, 70 Atl. 113 (1908); in this case the spread of a potential fire
was not the primary consideration. Rather, the case turned on the fact that a fire hose
could not reach great heights.
36. Supra note 33, at 737, paraphrasing Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations, 25 MIcH.
L. REV. 124, 130 (1926).
37. 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923).
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St. Louis.8 8 This decision-which held that the primary justification
for restriction upon signboards must be found in its relationship to
the protection of health, safety, and morals, but that aesthetic
considerations could be permitted as a valid purpose, if secondary
in nature-is still the law at the present time. But the trend of
the great majority of current decisions is to go much further than
merely permitting aesthetic values to be included. American tribun-
als are presently upholding all sorts of restrictions placed on the
use of private property based solely on aesthetic grounds.3 9 None-
theless, it should be recognized in passing that a few state courts
continue to strike down local ordinances and state statutes when
they believe that the regulations constitute an unreasonable inter-
ference with the use of the owner's property rights. For instance,
it has recently been held that requirements calling for the erection
of high fences merely to hide junk yards,40 or restrictions on bill-
board advertising4 ' are unconstitutional. But the few decisions
upholding the right of owners to use and enjoy their property at
the expense of community attempts at beautification clearly reflect
the older and now minority view. On the other hand, there is some
indication that courts are still willing to strike down grossly un-
reasonable interferences with the use of private property-at least
in a few instances. But such cases may be considered the exceptions
which prove the broad general rule announced in Berman v. Parker
that aesthetic considerations are sufficient to justify the use of
not only police power but also eminent domain. Subsequently, a
Wisconsin case, utilizing the Berman rule, stated that aesthetic
considerations could supply the primary justification for the exercise
of state police power.4 2 Further, it can be expected, in the opinion
38. 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911). See also Cusack Co. v. City of Clicago, 242 U.S.
526 (1917) ; the regulation which prevented the use of billboards of over twenty feet was
a subterfuge. For later cases, see Preferred Tires Inc. v. Village of H-empstead, 173 Misc.
1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1940) ; Walnut and Quince Streets Corp. v. Mills, 303 Pa. 25, 154
AtI. 29 (1931), wherein the court held that the City of Philadelphia could empower the
Fine Arts Commission to approve or disapprove proposed structures on city streets; con-
sequently, a theater marquee was disapproved on aesthetic grounds as being too garish
and overly illuminated.
39. Moore, Regulation of Outdoor Advertising for Aesthetic Purposes, 8 ST. Louis L.J.
191 (1963) ; Note, 6 ST. Louis L.3. 534 (1961). For a discussion of the earlier law see
Gardner, The Massachusetts Billboard Decision, 49 HARv. L. Rgv. 869 (1936), and Goldton
& Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARv. L. REv. 241 (1959).
40. State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959), in which the Supreme Court of
North Carolina invalidated a statute requiring the screening or fencing of any Junk yard,
trash, or garbage dump located within one hundred and fifty feet of any highway. Though
recognizing that the purpose of the act was to keep land fronting on highways clean and
attractive, the court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional on the grounds that it
was an improper exercise of police power. The action was predicated solely on aesthetic
considerations without a sufficient relationship to public health, safety, morals, or wel-
fare. Cf. Town of Vestal v. Bennett, 199 Misc. 41, 104 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1951). Since the
ordinance applied to all areas, aesthetic considerations did not control. See Note, 1960
DUKE L.J. 299. While the trend of current cases seems to be clearly in favor of the use
of police power to regulate private property for aesthetic considerations, a recent California
case, People v. Dickerson, 343 P.2d 809 (Calif. 1959), struck down a municipal ordinance
requiring that automobile wrecking businesses be surrounded by fences. Such a municipal
ordinance was declared to constitute an invalid exercise of police power, since Its aim
was merely to eliminate unsightly views. Such an aesthetic consideration constituted an
unreasonable interference with the right to carry on a legitimate business. See Note, 13
OKLA. L. RtEV. 222 (1960) for an excellent analysis of this limited area in relation to the
Berman case, at 223-224.
41. Supra note 39, and Note, 6 ST. Louis L.J. 534 (1961).
42. Savel and Park Holding Corp. v. Wleland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1956).
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of the writer, that similar decisions will rely on the Berman rule, as
more extensive redevelopment and renewal plans are tested before
federal and state tribunals. In Donnelly v. District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency 4 3 the court rejected appellant's argu-
ment that her properties, located within the redevelopment area,
should not be condemned because they were ". . .commercial in
character, containing modern and attractive business buildings, and
are quite distinct from the nearby blighted areas."4 4 It was held
that such properties had to be taken in order to carry out the total
plan, namely the development of a waterfront area and the simul-
taneous elimination of blighted regions. In striking down the
constitutional objection by utilizing the Berman rule the court
indicated: "No doubt there are limits to what can be done in the
name of 'redevelopment,' but those limits-as set by the Berman
case-have not been exceeded here."' 5 Though the court followed
the trend of such renewal actions, no additional light was shed upon
the problem under investigation, except insofar as this decision does
uphold an aesthetic consideration (the beautification of an entire
area) pursuant to a traditional eminent domain action. The court
never mentions the aesthetic objective; however, the implications
are rather obvious, in spite of the lack of specificity in the language
chosen, because an entire section of the nation's capital was
beautified.
EMINENT DOMAIN JOINED TO POLICE POWER
As indicated above, the traditionally separate legal doctrines of
police power and eminent domain are being merged. Specifically,
the United States Supreme Court feels that both powers are involved;
therefore, the problem arises, by way of analysis, as to what criteria
must be applied to test the validity of the District of Columbia Act.48
It must be recognized that the Court has held that the objective of
the Act is within the police power; hence, slum clearance is a valid
objective notwithstanding the associated purpose of making the
community beautiful, spacious, and well balanced.4 7  Under the
rationale of Berman the fifth amendment will not prevent the taking
of property on an area basis to eliminate and prevent substandard
43. 269 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
44. Id. at 547.
45. Ibid.
46. See supra note 12. The Act empowers the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Land Agency to acquire and assemble real property in order to "further the redevelop-
ment of blighted territory in the District of Columbia by the prevention, reduction, or
elimination of blighted factors or causes of blight." D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-704 (1960). The
Agency has the power, in accordance with the plan of the District of Columbia Planning
Commission, to transfer to the District all property to be devoted to public uses and to
sell the remainder to private individuals or corporations to redevelop In accordance with
the plan of the Commission. See also Mandelker, Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment.
28 TUL. L. REv. 96 (1953) for a discussion of state limitations on the use of the eminent
domain power. Generally, the state constitutions are interpreted less liberally than is the
federal constitution.
47. Accord: In re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Housing Projects, 306 Mich. 638, 11
N.W.2d 272 (1943); Stockus v. Boston Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 507, 24 N.E.2d 333
(1939) ; New York City Hohsing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
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housing and blighted areas if such taking is carried out pursuant to
a redevelopment plan. The fact that the property is later resold to
private individuals will not invalidate the original seizure. s Such
condemnation is constitutional, provided that just compensation is
given. The Court in evaluating the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act takes the position that"9
property may of course be taken for this redevelopment
which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending. ....
If owner after owner were premitted to resist these redevel-
opment programs on the ground that his particular property
was not being used against the public interest, integrated
plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly . . . . [C] om-
munity redevelopment programs need not, by force of the
Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis-lot by lot, building
by building.
The fundamental reason for the holding is that just compensation
has been given to the owners of seized property. Without such
compensation the taking for purely aesthetic purposes (or even if
only the primary purpose) would clearly be unconstitutional-at least
as our constitutional law exists at the present time. In other words,
the shifting of the compensation requirement from the fifth amend-
ment to the fourteenth has permitted a new use of police power. But
here lies the danger. Since there is no constitutional guarantee
requiring that property seized under police power need be compen-
sated, at what point can a state or the federal government seize
land and not give compensation? Moreover, could such seizure be
employed for punitive purposes, similar to present condemnation
actions against illegally used property? Many instances exist in
which restrictions have been placed on the use of property, and no
compensation has been given. Numerous zoning restrictions need
only be cited by way of illustration. 0 Specifically, the future thrust
of such coercion will take place in the area of urban renewal, since
property owners will (and are presently) being forced to conform
to various master plans designed to create attractive communities.
The result is that less freedom of action is left to the private land-
owner.
THE FuTURE OF THE NEW STANDARD
The last few years have witnessed an increase in the number
of decisions citing the Berman case generally on simple police power
questions, such as Symonds v. Bucklin,5 United States v. 239,129
48. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, v. 40 Parcels of Land, 171 F.
Supp. 138 (D. D.C. 1959), upholding the right of urban renewal on an area rather than
a structure-by-structure basis. Likewise, the aid of private enterprise was upheld.
49. 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
50. Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARv. L. Rv. 1622, 1638-1641(1962).
51. 197 F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961). The Berman case Is cited on the proposition that
zoning regulations, according to a comprehensive plan and in the general public welfare,
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Acres of Land,52 and United States v. Mischke.53 Such important
verdicts as Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing and Home
Finance Agency,' upheld the right of Illinois to seize private land
and then sell it to the University of Illinois for redevelopment as a
campus. Moreover, the balance of the land was to be turned over
to private enterprise for redevelopment as a residential area. "There
can be no doubt that these are proper public purposes and uses." 55
The court went on to state: 56
When such areas have been reclaimed and the redevelopment
achieved, the public purpose has been fully accomplished ....
The achievement of the redevelopment of slum and blight
areas, as defined in the [Illinois] act, in our opinion,
constitutes a public use and a public purpose regardless
of the use which may be made of the property after the
redevelopment has been achieved.
At present, the federal courts are relying very heavily on the
Berman doctrine. Moreover, this case is frequently cited in support
of police power or eminent domain decisions, tending to be very
traditional. 7 A number of typical eminent domain cases in which
property has been seized for obviously proper governmental functions
continually cite the broader Berman rule.5 8  Significantly, the
Supreme Court has not been called upon to elaborate upon the extent
to which police power incorporating elements from eminent domain
may be used as a single entity. So the future limits of this new
power have not been adequately set forth. Still, there seems to be
relatively little question concerning the power of a state or the
federal government to seize land under the police power doctrine.
RESTRICTIONS ON POLICE POWER
As indicated earlier in the study a few courts have resisted the
trend to permit almost unlimited public condemnation.5 9 In spite
may place restrictions on the use of property, even though the restrictions result in serious
financial loss to the owner . . . [since] highway plans are within the police power." Id.
at 685. But "zoning cannot be used as a substitute for eminent domain proceedings to de-
feat the payment of Just compensation by depressing values and so reducing the amount
of damages to be paid when private property is taken for public use." Ibid.
52. 192 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (action to condemn easement to land for the
construction of a government highway over which to haul government owned timber).
The decision cites Berman on the proposition that "where the power to take resides in
the Government, it is not for this Court to determine the quantum of estate which may be
taken." Id. at 102.
53. 285 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1961) (condemnation of land for the building of a govern-
ment dam). The Berman rule is cited on the proposition that once a public purpose has
been decided the court does not have jurisdiction to determine the amount and character
of the land, to be taken. Id. at 632.
54. 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962).
56. Id. at 105.
56. Id. at 106, quoting from Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Il. 114, 129, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25(1954).
57. United States v. 929.70 Acres of Land, 205 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.D. 1962). See supra
note 28.
58. United States v. 23.912 Acres of Land, 192 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Cal. 1961). The
court stated: "It is the law that, the power to condemn in such a case as this one is
coextensive with the power to purchase. . . . Where the power to take resides in the
Government, it is not for this Court to determine the quantun of estate which may be
taken .... I d. at 102.
59. See notes 40-41 aupra and notes 77-78 infra,
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of the fact that little serious question can be raised concerning the
right of a sovereign to seize land and subsequently turn it over to
private enterprise, a few courts have tended to invalidate abuses
of police power, particularly in those situations where unreasonable
restrictions were placed on the use and enjoyment of land.60
It remained for the Federal District Court of Oregon, in
Robertson v. City of Salem,"" further to explain the rationale of
Berman. In this rather involved dispute, concerning both the City
of Salem and the State of Oregon, a clear abuse of the police power
was present. The plaintiff instituted an action for declaratory
judgment against the City of Salem to test the validity of a zoning
ordinance that had been passed for the (improper) purpose of de-
pressing the value of the land. It was intended that either the City
or the State of Oregon would acquire the land for governmental use
at a lower price at some future date. Fortunately, the Federal
District Court held that the zoning ordinance was a clear abuse of
police power, since it was, in effect, a taking of land without due
process of law or the payment of just compensation. Consequently,
the ordinance was unconstitutional and void. In construing the
Berman rule, the Court stated that "if Oregon desires Robertson's
land for future public use, it should exercise its power of eminent
domain and give Robertson just compensation. -.62 This case
cuts down a small portion of Berman for the reason that the use
of police power (a restriction without just compensation) cannot
be employed in those situations where a city or state is really looking
to a subsequent seizure under the power of eminent domain. There-
fore, the court clearly makes the point that if the City of Salem or
the State of Oregon desires to seize the land for future use they
should exercise . . . power of eminent domain, as dictated
by the Constitution of the State of Oregon. Berman merely
holds that the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act . . .
wherein its administrative agency was given the power of
eminent domain in the course of the redevelopment of a
large area of the District of Columbia so as to eliminate
and prevent slum and substandard conditions, was consti-
tutional and that the administrative agency had the right
to acquire private property for such purpose by eminent
domain, which includes the present payment of just
compensation. "
The District Court goes on to point out that the requirements of
the fifth amendment have been met when just compensation has
been paid; and, in this dispute, compensation was all that was
being asked by the plaintiff. 'Despite the liberal approach taken by
60. Ibid.
61. 191 F. Supp. 604 (D. Ore. 1961).
62. Id. at 611.
63. Ibid.
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the great majority of American courts, a seizure-even though
compensation is awarded-will be struck down in those few instances
where statutory authority is exceeded. 64 Similarly, if zoning regula-
tions pursuant to police power, are ". . .used as a substitute for
eminent domain proceedings to defeat the payment of just compen-
sation. . .", such ordinance will be invalidated. 66
Generally, the courts insist on adequate compensation, regard-
less of whether eminent domain or police power is used, and the
key to the entire urban redevelopment programs is "just compen-
sation," as set forth in the fifth amendment.
JUST COMPENSATION
If any point of certainty is to arise from the present study it
is that the award of compensation makes the taking legal. That
is to say, our courts will no longer examine the motive behind such
seizure, the basis of the administrative determination, the standard
adopted by the lower court, the means chosen by the legislature,
the extent of the public use, the desirability of the public purpose,
the relationship to traditional police powers, and numerous other
criteria. Indeed, a number of decisions have clearly set forth the
rule that any "reasonable" taking will be upheld provided only that
"just compensation" is given. To illustrate, in the 1963 case of
United States v. Agee67 the court-relying on Berman-enunciated
the basic rule as follows:68 "Where the taking is for a public
purpose, the rights of the property owner are satisfied when he
receives just compensation which the fifth amendment requires as
the price of taking."
Unhappily, this merged concept of police power and eminent
domain has left relatively little protection to the small, and often
the poorer, landowners. Indeed, low income families-particularly
those belonging to minority groups69-are being displaced in order
to further community aims. Although it is not the purpose of this
article to discuss the social aspects of urban renewal, it must be
recognized that considerable merit exists in these efforts to make
America beautiful. The desirability of furthering aesthetic goals by
means of police power, supported by the threat of eminent domain,
64. Maiatico v. United States, 302 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
65. Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682, 685 (D. Md. 1961).
66. In the Symonds case, the court ruled: "A zoning ordinance which permanently
restricts the use of property so that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goesbeyond permissible regulation and must be regarded as a taking without just compen-
sation." Ibid.
67. 322 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1963). It needs to be stressed, however, that the amount
of compensation ultimately awarded does not in fact relieve the affected parties from
actual loss. See Berger, Current Problems Affecting Costs of Condemnation, 26 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 85 (1961).
68. Id. at 143,
69. "About two thirds of the people that have been forced to move are Negroes, PuertoRicans or other nonwhite groups." Nation's Business, supra note 9, at 84. On the other
hand, the necessity of reconsidering basic constitutional law because of the urbanization
of America can be seen in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
329
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
is not being intentionally downgraded. 70  But regardless of the
benefit derived from urban renewal and the even broader redevelop-
ment schemes by the community, the constitutional guarantees of
small landowners must be safeguarded, and such protection can
only result from a clarification of the present limits of police power.
Admittedly, this basic question remains unanswered, largely because
the Supreme Court has so far chosen to remain silent.
CONCLUSION
The lack of precision in the language of Berman v. Parker has
created a "gray area" in United States constitutional law for the
reason that the precise role to be played by the expanding "federal"
and state police power-as "influenced" by eminent domain-has
not been clearly indicated. Similarly, the degree of protection to
be afforded private property owners in the future has not been
established to the degree required in a democratic society, even
though the traditional standard of police power has been radically
changed. Such conclusion is-sadly-very obvious, but the writer
is especially disturbed by the fact that in Berman the power of
eminent domain was employed in a very "sneaky fashion" because
the Court admitted that the action by the District of Columbia
represented a taking of private property not for the purpose of slum
clearance but merely to develop a more attractive community. The
implication of this holding is that it will now be possible to coerce
property owners in a variety of situations because of the inherent
threat that their property will be seized if they do not conform to
administrative determinations. 1 In fact, the most pressing disputes
will arise from urban renewal programs, requiring owners to modify
existing structures, which are admittedly safe, merely to conform
with various master plans. In the event that "cooperation" is not
forthcoming, the "unattractive" structures will be likely condemned
and subsequently resold to other private individuals who are willing
to conform. And this type of coercion is now possible under the
Berman concept, as constitutional law affords greater deference to
community goals, particularly in those situations where restrictions
are placed on the use and enjoyment of property.
The extension of eminent domain into that area formerly
reserved to police power has provided governmental agencies with
a powerful sanction. But the real solution to the numerous problems
created by these constitutional changes might better be resolved
70. See Rhyne, The Workable Program-A Challenge for Community Improvement, 25
LAW & CoNrEMp. PROB. 685 (1960). But see Nutting, Standards in Zoning and Planning
Legislation, 50 A.B.A.J. 1097 (1964).
71. In passing, it might be well to note the expanding use of state police power to
preserve existing structures and areas for aesthetic and historical purposes. Indeed, police
power is becoming a double edged sword, giving the community the right to preserve
existing buildings, as well as the right to destroy them pursuant to a larger plan. See
Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63
COL. L. Rv. 708 (1963).
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by improving present administrative law criteria. Perhaps the indi-
vidual can obtain the needed protection before administrative and
arbitration boards rather than courts of law.
Certainly the writer is not questioning the desirability of creating
attractive areas in the nation's capital (or in any other section of
the United States); rather issue is being taken as to: (1) the lack
of specificity and detailed legal reasoning in Berman v. Parker,
(2) the lack of consideration given by the Court to the need of the
community to protect private property, and (3) the confusion caused
by the "merging" of the police power with eminent domain, result-
ing in a lack of clarity as to the scope of these formerly "separate
and distinct" powers. The conclusion seems inescapable that the
individual citizen, the poorer private property holder, and the small
land owner lacking "political influence" have considerably less
protection under the fifth and fourteenth amendments as a result
of the Berman decision. The Supreme Court might have indicated
the sources upon which this "judicial legislation" rests. Is the
Berman case an example of a sociological decision? We can only
speculate as to the answer; the Court does not squarely meet the
fundamental issues. Thus, the exact rationale of the case has yet
to be determined.
In spite of the above criticism, it is recognized that our develop-
ing society is in need of extensive urban planning, redevelopment,
and improvement because of such basic changes as the population
explosion, the urbanization of the United States, and the increasing
emphasis on industrialization, to name just a few. The corresponding
necessity for city planning and local projects is, likewise, conceded.
Admittedly, the extensive economic, social, and political ramifi-
cations were too extensive and involved for the Court to consider
them in a single opinion.
We must make a basic value judgment as to the type of society
in which we desire to live. It seems impracticable-if not absolutely
impossible-to have: (1) the maximum amount of individual free-
dom, with a corresponding right to ownership and use of private
property, and (2)-at the same time-the maximum degree of
governmental planning, regulation, and redevelopment. Thus, two
basic interests clash, and the final issue becomes: which one is
the more important interest that must be protected by the com-
munity and also by our courts. The Supreme Court has given only
a partial answer by recognizing that changing social conditions are
now in conflict with the constitution-as originally conceived and
drafted. Such social modifications will influence the developing
law in this country for the reason that sociology, politics and the
other social sciences are evolving much more rapidly than constitu-
tional law.
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The question as to whether government will rely to a greater
degree on the use of the police power in order to avoid the more
restricted scope of eminent domain cannot be fully answered;
however, the Robertson case72 brings out the basic rule that where
an actual taking results, compensation will have to be paid, regard-
less of the alleged legal basis of the action. Such a practice will
assure "just" compensation; but the power of government to seize
property for aesthetic reasons will thereby become almost unlimited.
A public use, in the traditional sense, no longer need be proven.
Consequently, at least one conclusion is inescapable; the award of
compensation renders the taking legal. As such, the only protection
left to the individual is that the seizure be reasonable and that he
receive remuneration.
The writer believes that when the fundamental determination is
made concerning the type of society in which we all desire to live,
the conclusion to be reached is that an expansion of the right to
receive just compensation (and simultaneously to live in a more
aesthetically pleasing community) is an inadequate substitute for
traditional constitutional rights.
72. Supra note 61.
